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Abstract 
This paper looks at the effects of taxes increase on economic growth of 47 developing countries. In developing 
countries, there is no magic tax strategy to encourage economic growth. Some countries with high tax burdens have 
high growth rates and some countries with low tax burdens have low growth rates. Despite much theoretical and 
empirical inquiry as well as political and policy controversy, no simple answer exists concerning the relationship of 
taxes on economic growth in developing countries. The research takes an empirical approach to analyze the effects of 
four types of taxes namely taxes revenue, taxes on goods and services, taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 
and taxes on international trade on economic growth. Mobilizing a dynamic panel data over the period 2000–
2012 and using the system GMM estimator to address endogeneity issues, the econometric results yield that (i) 
there is a non-linear relationship between taxes revenue and economic growth, specifically, these taxes increase 
economic growth at short run and this effect then increases over time as these taxes increase, and (ii) there is a non-
linear (U-shaped) relationship between taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on international trade and 
economic growth, specifically, these taxes lower economic growth at short run and these effects then diminish over 
time as these taxes increase.  
JEL CODES : C33; H20; H21; H27; O40. 
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1. Introduction 
Although specific tax policy decisions normally are (and should be) debated and contested, there 
is considerable agreement at the international level about what are the important tax issues and 
appropriate tax policy directions for developing countries (Fjeldstad, 2013). Much of this relative 
consensus is reflected in the IMF’s latest policy statement “Revenue Mobilization in Developing 
Countries” (IMF, 2011). Thus, Fjeldstad (2013) thinks that an effective tax system is considered 
central for sustainable development because it can mobilize the domestic revenue base as a key 
mechanism for developing countries to escape from aid or single natural resource dependency.  
Intensified competition between countries and increasing demand for publicly financed services 
pressure countries’ tax systems to be designed in efficient ways. In order to design efficient tax 
systems it is crucial to know how distortive and harmful different taxes are to economic growth. 
Even in developed countries with stable, long-established tax systems and excellent data, there is 
still much we do not understand about the complex subject of the effects of taxation on growth. 
Our understanding of the relationship of tax on growth in developing countries is even less 
complete. According to Gordon and Li (2005), tax policies seen in developing countries are 
much more puzzling on many dimensions, given the sharp contrast between these policies and 
both those seen in developed countries and those forecast in the optimal tax literature. 
Sure enough, there is no magic tax strategy to encourage economic growth in developing 
countries. Some countries with high tax burdens have high growth rates and some countries with 
low tax burdens have low growth rates. Despite much theoretical and empirical inquiry as well as 
political and policy controversy, no simple answer exists concerning the relationship of tax on 
economic growth especially in developing countries.  
Theoretical literature suggests that tax have a negative effect on economic growth. Thus, high tax 
rates diminish economic growth. The reason for this is that higher rates may be more 
distortionary and hence impact growth negatively while lower rates may generate revenues that 
are spent in productive ways. However, the empirical literature suggests both direct and inverse 
relationship between tax burdens and rates of growth. Sure enough, higher tax burden can 
decrease or elevate the rate of economic growth. Thus, future economic output may be higher 
with the optimal rate of taxation and hence future tax revenues would be higher with a lower rate 
of taxation. 
Recent studies (Skinner, 1988; Easterly and Robelo, 1993; Padda and Akram, 2009; Worlu and 
Emeka, 2012; Bujang et al., 2013; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2013; etc.) analyzed the empirical 
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effets of taxes on economic growth in developing countries and are obtain non consensual clear 
results as the theory suggests. 
Skinner (1988) used data from African countries to conclude that income, corporate, and import 
taxation led to greater reductions in output growth than average export and sales taxation. 
Easterly and Robelo (1993) use growth model and sample includes 32 developing countries to 
experiment with a method of obtaining average marginal income tax rates that combines 
information on statutory rates with the amount of tax revenue collected and with data on income 
distribution. As they would expect, there is a positive correlation between their income weighted 
average marginal tax rates and the level of real per capita income. This simply reflects the fact 
that developed economies tend to rely more on income taxes than less developed countries. As 
for them, Padda and Akram (2009) tests whether tax policies conducted by Pakistan, India and 
Sri Lanka have transitory or permanent effect on their economic growth over the period 1973–
2008 and they find that the impact of tax rate changes is transitory and negative for short-term in 
Pakistan and India but for Sri Lanka its positive for first year and thereafter it has also negative 
effect on economic growth. By examining the impact of tax revenue on the economic growth of 
Nigeria judging from its impact on infrastructural development from 1980 to 2007, Worlu and 
Emeka (2012) find that tax revenue stimulates economic growth through infrastructural 
development. However, Bujang et al. (2013) investigates the long-run relationship between tax 
structure and economic growth and the other economic indicators via panel unit root tests and 
panel cointegration analysis in developing and high-income Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. Panel cointegration test reveal that there is no 
long-run cointegrating relationship between tax structure and both of GDP and gross saving in 
developing countries. Moerover, Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2013) evaluate the effect of the most 
important tax instruments of Latin American countries (personal income tax, corporate income 
tax, general taxes on goods and services, including value added and other sales taxes, and 
revenues from natural resource) on economic growth using vector autoregressive techniques, and 
for close to the entire region and a worldwide sample of developing and developed countries 
using panel data estimation. They find that, for the most part, personal income tax does not have 
the expected negative effect on economic growth in Latin America. They also find small negative 
effects of corporate income tax on growth for individual countries, specifically Argentina, 
Mexico, and Chile. Finally, their results suggest that greater reliance on consumption taxes has 
significant positive effects on growth in Latin American in general. 
In practice, most of the taxes are distortionary in the opposed direction from fixed taxes; ceteris 
paribus, they have therefore tendency to deform resource allocation through their impact on 
saving and investment. However, the act that they have or not a perverse effect on growth in the 
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net terms depends on profits in terms of the expenditures growth that they serve to finance. 
More generally, it is not all distortionary taxes which have some adverse effects on economic 
growth at long-term; the net effect depends on the fact that the considered tax is or no used as an 
instrument to correct negative externalities or other distortions. The effect of taxation on the 
level of investment operates through the capital cost. The evidence of this effect is limited for 
developing countries. The taxation can nevertheless affect investment through a differentiated 
structure of the profits taxation rate (Agénor, 2005). 
For Fjeldstad (2013) one issue for empirical research on tax and growth in developing countries 
should include efforts to mobilize new empirical evidence on the impacts of different corporate 
tax policies, and tax incentives and exemptions. Because the study of the effect of taxation on 
growth models continues to be an extremely active research area, this scarcity of empirical work 
is due to the difficulties involved in measuring the relevant impacts of four types of taxes on 
economic growth in developing countries. More specifically, the contribution of this research is 
therefore to analyze the effects of the taxes revenue, the taxes on goods and services, the taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains and the taxes on international trade on economic growth of 47 
developing countries by mobilizing a most recent available dynamic panel data  
The paper is organized as follow. The next section presents the model of this study. Section 3 
presents the data while section 4 describes the estimation method. Section 5 presents the 
estimation results and section 6 the graphical analysis. Finally section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Model 
The dynamic panel data model which we use is designed to capture the effects of taxes on 
economic growth in 47 developing countries. To this end, we develop an econometric model in 
which the characteristics of each country are modeled as specific effects which are here 
unobservable variables, constants in time and expected to affect their behavior. Taking into 
account the sources of unobserved heterogeneity allows completing heterogeneity carried by the 
observable variables included in the model. The regression model which we estimate can be 
written as follows: 
                                                                            
taxrev taxrev taxgs taxgs taxipc taxipc
taxit taxit
it it it it it it it it
it it it i t it
y y
x
2 2 2
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1 2
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where 
it
y
 
is the dependent variable (GDP per capita growth rate of country i at time period t) 
it
taxrev
 
is the taxes revenue, 
it
taxgs  is the taxes on goods and services, 
it
taxipcg  is the taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains, 
it
taxit  represents the taxes on international trade, itx  is the 
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vector of explanatory variables. The 
i
µ
 
terms are fixed country effects (unmeasured shocks). The 
λ
t
 terms are sample-wide period effects (temporal specific effect). The error 
it
ε
 
terms are 
idiosyncratic distributions which vary by country and over time and are assumed to be iid 
(independent and identically distributed) with zero mean and a variance equal to 2εσ . As already 
noted i and t respectively represent the country index and the time index. α , γ
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 and β  are the parameters to be estimated.  
We can write now the growth model: 
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Where the variables and the coefficients are the same as in equation (1). 
3. Data 
We use available dynamic panel data of 47 developing countries observed over the period 2000-
2012 to analyze the effects of taxes on economic growth. The data are annual and come from the 
statistics tables of the World Bank (World Data Indicator 2014). Table 1 in appendix A shows a 
summary description of the variables. Appendix A contains also a variable description with their 
sources (table 2). Further, a list of the 47 developing countries (18 of Africa, 14 of Asia, 8 of 
Europe and 7 of America) included in this study is presented in appendix C. 
it
grwgdppc  is the dependent variable in our model. It is measured by the GDP per capita growth 
(annual average in per cent). Between the period 2000-2008, the growth rate of GDP per capita 
average of 47 developing countries has increased by 177.74% from 37.8% in 2000 to 215.57% in 
2012 (see figure 2 appendix B). Then it rose to 182.67% in 2012 representing a decrease of 
32.87% on average.  
The explanatory variables include the interest variables of this study and the control variables. 
Taxes namely taxes revenue (
it
taxrev ), taxes on goods and services (
it
taxgs ), taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains (
it
taxipc ) and finally taxes on international trade (
it
taxit ) and theirs 
squared terms represent the interest variables of this study, and others variables are the control 
variables namely 
 
initial income per capita ( iipc
it
); inflation rate (
it
infl ), ratio of government 
expenditure (
it
ggfce ), investment (
it
inv ), ratio of savings as share of GDP (
it
gds ), labor force 
growth rate (
it
lfg ), unemployment ( unempl
it
), dependency ratio of the population (
it
popag ) and 
trade openness (
it
opne ). 
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it
taxrev  which is the taxes revenue variable refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most 
social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue. Currently, the governments of developing countries 
collect much lower proportions of their GDPs in tax revenue than do the governments of the 
OECD countries: 10-20% rather than 30-40%. Their tax effort indices (revenue collections 
relative to estimated revenue potentials) are also lower than those of the OECD countries. 
(Mascagni et al., 2014). Ratios of tax revenue to gross domestic product (GDP) in developing 
countries are typically in the range of 15 to 20%, compared with 30% in industrialized nations 
(World Bank, 1991). 
it
taxgs  is the taxes on goods and services variable and include general sales and turnover or value 
added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use of goods or 
property, taxes on extraction and production of minerals, and profits of fiscal monopolies.  
it
taxipc  is the taxes on income, profits, and capital gains variable and is levied on the actual or 
presumptive net income of individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on 
capital gains, whether realized or not, on land, securities, and other assets. Intragovernmental 
payments are eliminated in consolidation. Patterns of income taxation (both in level and in 
composition) differ from country to country because of economic, cultural and historical factors 
(Bonu and Pedro Motau, 2009). It is assumed that a higher income tax rates (ITR) leads to a 
higher tax revenue collection which in turn, will enhance the economic development of any 
country, especially in developed nations as compared to developing or under-developed nations 
(Slemord, 2003). 
it
taxit  is the taxes on international trade variable and include import duties, export duties, profits 
of export or import monopolies, exchange profits, and exchange taxes. According to Fjeldstad 
(2013), for so many developing countries which have fitted into the global division of labour as 
exporters of primary products, international trade has been the obvious place for their 
governments to gather revenue. In 1975, trade taxes were a very minor source of government 
revenue in high income countries, but were significant in both middle and low-income countries. 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) estimate that by 2000 governments of middle-income countries had 
found other means to replace about 45-60 per cent of the trade revenues they had foregone, 
while for low-income countries the figure was at best around 30 per cent.
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iipc
it
 is the initial income per capita variable. The one is measured by the GDP per capita for the 
initial year of each subperiod (current prices). This variable allows taking in account the 
conditional convergence (at the starting point). Solow (1956) growth model predicts that the 
economies which have an initial income level little high grow more quickly than those in which 
the initial income level is more important and near their stationary state. Thus, this variable is 
assumed to influence negatively economic growth in developing countries for the economic 
growth rhythm of the developing countries having a higher initial GDP per capita is weaker than 
the one of the developing countries having a weaker initial GDP per capita. 
it
infl  is the inflation rate variable (annual in per cent) in developing countries. This variable is 
calculated with the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Although this variable keeps ambivalent 
relationships with economic growth (Nubukpo, 2007), we assume that this variable must 
influence negatively economic growth due to his negative impact on purchasing power of 
consumers. 
 
it
ggfce  is the government expenditure variable. This one is measured by the general government 
final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP (in per cent). Theoretically, this variable must 
influence economic growth negatively due to the distortionary effect of taxation. There is an 
extensive literature examining the relationship between government expenditures and economic 
growth. Many of these studies (Barro, 1991; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001 and 2006; Romero-
Avila and Strauch, 2008 and Bergh and Karlsson, 2010) tend to find a negative relationship 
between size of government, typically measured as total government or government 
consumption expenditures (as in this paper), and economic growth. However, others studies 
(Ram, 1986; Devaranjan et al., 1996 and Agell et al., 2006) dispute this negative relationship and it 
is appear that the lack of consensus may not be surprising as the overall size of the government 
has two contrasting effects. A larger size means higher taxes that impose larger distortions in the 
economy, but higher levels of public spending may also boost economic growth as part of the 
spending is growth enhancing. Moreover, using public consummation ratio as a share of GDP (in 
per cent) over the period 1971-1995, Tenou (1999) obtains a negative relationship with economic 
growth in the West-African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. Dackehag and 
Hansson (2012) studying the relationship between income tax (corporate income tax and 
personal income tax) and economic growth of 25 rich OECD countries find also a negative 
effect of government expenditures on economic growth. 
it
inv  represents the investment variable. This one is measured with the gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP (in per cent). For neoclassic school than Keynesian theory, 
investment is a factor of economic growth. Some empirical studies on African economies (Ojo 
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and Oshikoya, 1995; Ghura and Hadjimichael, 1996) have highlighted the presence of a positive 
relationship between investment and economic growth. 
it
gds  is the saving variable and is measured with the gross domestic savings as share of GDP. 
Dackehag and Hansson (2012) find a negative, although insignificant coefficient for this variable. 
it
lfg  is the labor force growth variable (in per cent). This one is measured with the total labor 
force growth and assumes to influence negatively economic growth in developing countries. 
unempl
it
 is the unemployment variable. The one is measured by the total unemployment as a 
share of total labor force (in per cent). This variable is assumed to influence negatively economic 
growth in developing countries. 
it
popag  represents the dependency ratio variable. This variable is measured with the population 
aged 0-14 and upper 65 as a share of the total population. This one is assumed to influence 
negatively economic growth in developing countries. 
it
opne  is the openness trade variable and measured with export and import as a share of GDP (in 
per cent). It is difficult to predict the effect of the openness trade variable on economic growth 
for the developing countries due to the fact that these ones import much more than they do not 
export and the strong dependence of their exports to the raw materials submitted to the foreign 
terms deterioration.  
We test the stationary of the all variables included in the model using the unit root tests on panel 
data of Fisher-type. Sure enough, Fisher-type test allows unbalanced panels and gaps in any panel to 
be tested, and performs Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) or Phillips-Perron (PP) tests for each 
panel. All the series are stationary in level with constant (see table 3 of appendix A).  
4. Estimation methods 
Sometimes, the lagged levels of the regressors are poor instruments for the first-differenced 
regressors. Thus, to derive more general conclusions about the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth in developing countries, we use the system GMM approach of Arellano and 
Bond (1991). We believe that this strategy allows controlling individual and temporal specifics 
effects with short-run dynamics and solving variables endogeneity bias, simultaneous bias, inverse 
causality and omitted variables problems and provides more precise estimates of the effects of 
taxes on economic growth in developing countries.  
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The system GMM estimator uses the level equation (e.g. equation (1)) to obtain a system of two 
equations: one differenced (see equation (3) below) and one in level. By adding the second 
equation, additional instruments can be obtained. Thus, the variables in levels in the second 
equation are instrumented with their own first differences. This usually increases efficiency. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
α γ
γ δ
δ
− − − 1 −
2 2
2 − 1 −
2
− = − + −
                                     + − + −
                                     +
1 1 2 1
1 1
it it it it it it
it it it it
it
grwgdppc grwgdppc grwgdppc grwgdppc taxrev taxrev
taxrev taxrev taxgs taxgs
taxgs( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ψ
ψ φ
φ β λ λ ε ε
2 2
− 1 −
2 2
2 − 1 −
2 2
2 − − −
− + −
                                     + − + −
                                     + −  + − + − + −
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
it it it
it it it it
it it it it t t it
x x
taxgs taxipc taxipc
taxipc taxipc taxit taxit
taxit taxit ( )         −1it (3)
 
Where
it it
y=grwgdppc   and 
[ ]′iipc infl ggfce inv gds lfg unempl popag opneit it it it it it it it it itx = .  
The first difference eliminates countries specific effect and consequently the bias of time 
invariant omitted variables. By construction, the term ( )it it−−ε ε 1  is correlated with the lagged 
variable in difference ( )it it− −−1 2grwgdppc grwgdppc . The first differences of the explanatory 
variables are instrumented by the lagged values (in level) of those same variables. The objective is 
to reduce the simultaneous bias and the bias due to presence of the lagged dependent variable in 
difference at the left of equation (3).  
Equation in first difference (equation 3) is estimated simultaneously with equation in level 
(equation 1) by the GMM. In the equation in level, the variables are instrumented by their first 
differences. At this level, only the more recent first difference is used. Using other lagged firsts 
differences result in redundancy of moments’ conditions (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Blundell 
and Bond (1998) tested this method with the simulations of Monte Carlo. They found that the 
GMM estimator in system is more efficient than GMM estimator in differences. The latter 
produces the biased coefficients for small samples. Bias is as much more important than the 
variables are persistent in time, the specific effects are important and the temporal dimension of 
the panel is weak. 
For equation in level, one uses additional moments’ conditions supposing that the explanatory 
variables are stationary. 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i it− − −− + = 0     = 11   τ τ µ ε τgrwgdppc grwgdppc forE                                 (4) 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i it− − −1− + = 0             =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxrev taxrev forE                                 (5) 
                  ( ) ( ) ⋅ it it i it2 2− − −1− + = 0             =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxrev taxrev forE                                 (6) 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i it− − −1− + = 0                =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxgs taxgs forE                                 (7) 
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                  ( ) ( ) ⋅ it it i it2 2− − −1− + = 0                =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxgs taxgs forE                                 (8) 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i it− − −1− + = 0              =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxipc taxipc forE                                (9) 
                  ( ) ( ) ⋅ it it i it2 2− − −1− + = 0              =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxipc taxipc forE                              (10) 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i it− − −1− + = 0                 =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxit taxit forE                               (11) 
                  ( ) ( ) ⋅ it it i it2 2− − −1− + = 0                 =1  τ τ µ ε τtaxit taxit forE                               (12) 
                  ( ) ( )⋅  it it i itx x− − −1− + = 0                           =1  τ τ µ ε τforE                              (13) 
Moments’ conditions above (equations 4 to 13) associate with GMM allow estimating the 
coefficients of the model. To test the validity of the lagged variables as instruments, Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest overidentified test 
of Sargent/Hansen. By construction, the error term in first difference is correlated yields first 
order conditions, but it must not been to the second order. To test this hypothesis, these same 
authors suggest a second order autocorrelation test. 
Further, we used different approaches to test the robustness of the results. Indeed, the 
hypothesis of non autocorrelation in the regression model of the errors terms is essential so that 
the GMM estimator is efficient. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a test which allows verifying 
the absence of first and second order autocorrelation. Thus, if there is absence of autocorrelation 
in the distribution of errors terms, this test gives a negative and significant value of the 
differentiated residues in the first order and non significant in the second order. This test which 
is based on auto-covariance standardized average residues follows a normal law under the null 
hypothesis. By another way, the authors proposed the instruments validity test of Sargent. Thus, 
if the weighting matrix is optimally selected for a given instrument matrix, Sargent test statistics 
follows asymptotically a law of chi2 under the null hypothesis of the validities instruments. 
Hansen tests and the second order autocorrelation tests of Arellano and Bond in general, do not 
allow rejecting the hypothesis of the validity of lagged variables in level and in differences as 
instrument, and the hypothesis non autocorrelation in second order (see table 4 of appendix A). 
In general, the results of our estimations are robust to eliminate rigorously all bias due to the non 
observed individual heterogeneity and offer, consequently, a better efficiency of our estimations 
results.  
5. Estimation results and interpretation  
Table 6 in appendix A reports the results from the regression of the taxes and the GDP per 
capita growth of 47 developing countries (see country list in appendix C). In this table, we have 
done eight (8) estimations.  
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In column (1) only the lagged GDP per capita growth, the level of the four taxes without their 
squared terms and the control variables namely initial income per capita, inflation rate, ratio of 
government expenditure, investment, ratio of savings as share of GDP, labor force growth rate, 
unemployment, dependency ratio of the population and trade openness are included as 
explanatory variables. The lagged GDP per capita growth variable has a positive and significant 
coefficient. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent significance levels. 
Interestingly, the level of the taxes revenue is positive and statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent significance level. Interestingly again, the level of the taxes on income, profits, and capital 
gains and the level of the taxes on international trade are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 and 5 per cent significance levels respectively. However, the taxes on goods and services 
have negative, although insignificant coefficients. Moreover, all the control variables have 
significant coefficients except the investment variable.  
In column (2) all the variables with the squared terms of the four taxes variables and the lagged 
GDP per capita growth except the inflation rate variable are included as explanatory variables. 
The lagged GDP per capita growth variable has a positive and significant coefficient. This 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent significance level. Interestingly, the level of 
the taxes revenue is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent significance level while 
the squared term is negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent significance level. 
Interestingly again the level of the taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and the level of the 
taxes on international trade are negative and statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent 
significance levels. The squared term of the taxes on income, profits, and capital gains is positive 
and statistically insignificant but that of the taxes on international trade is also positive however 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent significance level. The level of the taxes on goods and 
services is negative, although insignificant while the squared term is positive and also 
insignificant. Moreover, all the control variables have significant coefficients except the 
investment and the trade openness variables.  
In columns (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), we do the same thing as in column (2) however instead of 
excluding the inflation variable we have exclude the ratio of government expenditure, the 
investment, the ratio of savings as share of GDP, the labor force growth rate and the 
unemployment respectively. In columns (8) we include all the variables without exception. The 
lagged GDP per capita growth variable has a positive and significant coefficient in columns (3)- 
(8). The value of this coefficient is given by the dynamic panel data specification of Arellano and 
bound (1991). Therefore, we need to estimate the value of the coefficient −α 1  in the growth 
model of equation (2). We calculate the t-student of the coefficient −α 1  which is equal to αα σ . 
Table 5 of appendix A gives the values of the coefficient −α 1  of all our estimations. This 
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coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent significance level in all our 
estimations.  
In all columns except columns (3) and (7), the level of the taxes revenue has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on economic growth while the squared term has a negative and 
statistically significant (except in columns (5) and (7)) effect on economic growth. This suggests 
that there is a non-linear relationship between taxes revenue and economic growth. Specifically, 
low levels taxes revenue has a positive influence while higher taxes hamper economic growth.  
As the taxes on goods and services variable has insignificant coefficient in all the estimations, we 
cannot conclude about the effect of these taxes on economic growth of the 47 developing 
countries of the study. However in the next section we will carry out a graphical analysis for these 
ones. 
Further, in all columns without exception, the level of the taxes on income, profits, and capital 
gains has a negative and statistically significant impact on economic growth while the squared 
term has a negative and statistically significant (except in columns (2) and (7)) effect on economic 
growth. Thus, taxes revenue increase economic growth at short run and this effect then increases 
over time as these taxes increase in developing countries. Moreover, the level of the taxes on 
international trade has a negative and statistically significant (except in columns (3) and (7)) 
impact on economic growth while the squared term has a negative and statistically significant 
(except in columns (3), (4) and (7)) effect on economic growth. This suggests that there is a non-
linear relationship (U-shaped) between taxes on income, profits, and capital gains, taxes on 
international trade and economic growth. Specifically, low levels taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains and taxes on international trade have a negative influence while higher taxes 
encourage economic growth. Thus, taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and taxes on 
international trade lower economic growth at short run in developing countries and these effects 
then diminish over time as these taxes increase.  
Turning to the explanatory variables, initial income per capita has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on GDP per capita growth in all our estimations, supporting the catching-up 
hypothesis. Inflation and ratio of government expenditure have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on GDP per capita growth in all our estimations except in column (7) for the 
ratio of government expenditure variable. This suggests that developing countries must work to 
maintain the inflation rate at the weak levels and to reduce considerably the general government 
final consumption expenditure. However, savings, labor force growth rate, unemployment, 
dependency ratio of the population and trade openness have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on GDP per capita growth in most of our estimations. This suggests ceteris paribus that 
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these variables favor GDP per capita growth in developing countries. Finally, the investment 
variable has a positive (except in columns (1)), although insignificant coefficients.  
In general, the magnitude of the coefficients in columns (1) to (8) is fairly stable across the 
different specifications. Thus, considering column (8), the study suggests that a one per cent 
increase in taxes revenue raises economic growth in developing countries by approximately 1.342 
per cent. Moreover, the study suggests that a one per cent increase in taxes on income, profits, 
and capital gains or in taxes on international trade lowers GDP per capita growth in developing 
countries by approximately -0.444 and -0.244 per cent respectively. Finally, the first-order 
conditions for column (8) with respect to taxes revenue suggests that developing countries can 
increase their taxes revenue up to 53.68 levels without hamper their economic growth. But the 
first-order condition for column (8) with respect to taxes on income, profits, and capital gains or 
with respect to taxes on international trade suggest that increasing of taxes on income, profits, 
and capital gains or taxes on international trade above 44.4 and 24.4 levels respectively favors 
economic growth of developing countries. As the economists (Mascagni et al., 2014) agree, these 
findings suggest that there is considerable potential to increase taxes revenues in developing 
countries. 
6. Graphical analysis 
An alternative empirical approach is to draw on the experience of different countries to 
investigate how tax policy affects economic growth. There is some evidence that how a country 
collects taxes matters for economic growth. We have carried up as in Mendoza et al. (1996) 
graphical analysis of the relationship between each tax (taxes revenue, taxes on goods and 
services, taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and taxes on international trade) and GDP 
growth per capita in developing countries. All plots (see figures 1 to 4 of appendix B) include a 
linear regression (pooled (overall) regression) curve and a quadratic regression curve which is not 
appear in the Mendoza et al. (1996) graphical analysis. Figures 1 to 4 show the correlation among 
the developing countries between these taxes and economic growth over the period 2000–2012. 
The results of table 6 in appendix A reflect the intuition derived from the scatter diagrams in 
figures 1 to 4 of appendix B.  
Sure enough, figure 1 plots GDP growth per capita against taxes revenue for all developing 
countries included in the study. The plots of figure 1 suggest both a positive relationship, roughly 
linear except at the extreme ends and a non-linear relationship (quite modest) between taxes 
revenue and economic growth. We can see that some countries as Angola, South Africa and 
Namibia which are all African countries exhibit in average a high level of taxes revenue.  
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Figure 2 plots GDP growth per capita against taxes on goods and services for the same 
developing countries in all years. Figure 2 suggests both a negative relationship, also roughly 
linear except at the extreme ends and a non-linear relationship (also quite modest) between taxes 
on goods and services and economic growth of the 47 developing countries. We can also see that 
some countries as Guatemala in America, Georgia in Asia, Nicaragua in America and Sri Lanka in 
Asia exhibit in average a high level of taxes on goods and services.  
Figure 3 plots GDP growth per capita against taxes on income, profits, and capital gains for the 
developing countries included in the study in all years. The plots of figure 3 suggest both a 
negative relationship, roughly linear except at the extreme ends and a non-linear (U-shaped) 
relationship between taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and economic growth of the 47 
developing countries. Figure 3 shows that some countries as South Africa and Malaysia in Asia, 
exhibit in average a high level of taxes on income, profits, and capital gains.  
Finally, figure 4 plots GDP growth per capita against taxes on international trade for the same 
developing countries in all years. Figure 4 suggests both a negative relationship, roughly linear 
except at the extreme ends and a non-linear relationship between taxes on international trade and 
economic growth of the 47 developing countries. Further, we can see that Cote d’Ivoire in 
African exhibits in average a high level of taxes on international trade.  
For all figures (1-4), we can see that Armenia in Asia exhibits in average the highest impact of 
taxes on economic growth. However, Cote d’Ivoire exhibits in average the lowest impact of taxes 
on economic growth.  
In general, these scatter plots, largely confirmed in regression analysis (except taxes on goods and 
services which have insignificant coefficient), suggest that taxes on goods and services, taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains and taxes on international trade are more harmful to economic 
growth than broadbased taxes revenue at short run but at long run it is the inverse phenomenon 
when the corresponding taxes increase.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper aims to provide some insights into the relationship between taxation of different 
sources of income and economic growth. We do so by study the effects of four categories taxes 
namely taxes revenue, taxes on goods and services, taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and 
finally taxes on international trade on economic growth of 47 developing countries by mobilizing 
a dynamic panel data over the period 2000–2012 and using the system GMM estimator to 
address endogeneity issues. Unlike many previous studies we allow for taxes having a non-linear 
effect on economic growth. The reason for this is that higher rates may be more distortionary 
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and hence impact growth negatively while lower rates may generate revenues that are spent in 
productive ways. We find empirical support for a non-linear relationship form the econometric 
results which yield two important findings. First, there is a non-linear relationship between taxes 
revenue and economic growth. Specifically, the taxes revenue increase economic growth at short 
run. This effect then increases over time as these taxes increase. Second, there is a non-linear (U-
shaped) relationship between taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on international 
trade and economic growth. Specifically, the taxes on income, profits and capital gains and the 
taxes on international trade lower economic growth at short run. These effects then diminish 
over time as these taxes increase.  
Furthermore, the study suggests that there is considerable potential to increase taxes revenues in 
developing countries. Sure enough, the first-order condition for column (8) with respect to taxes 
revenue suggests that developing countries can increase their taxes revenue up to 53.68 levels 
without hamper their economic growth. But the first-order conditions for column (8) with 
respect to taxes on income, profits, and capital gains or with respect to taxes on international 
trade suggest that increasing of taxes on income, profits, and capital gains or taxes on 
international trade above 44.4 and 24.4 levels respectively favors economic growth of developing 
countries. 
Of course, nearly any tax will tend to distort economic behavior along some margin, so the 
objective of a well-designed tax system is to avoid highly distortionary taxes and raise revenue 
from the less distortionary ones. So, it needs to be emphasised that developing countries 
policymakers will need to examine very carefully the trade-off between these growth-enhancing 
proposals and other objectives of tax systems particularly equity. According to Fjeldstad (2013), 
while we know quite a lot about the ways in which tax policy and practices might undermine 
economic growth, there is little evidence on the ways in which tax systems might be designed 
positively to accelerate growth. It is important to avoid the temptation to seek general 
conclusions about how taxation might affect growth (or any other policy objective) without 
paying close attention to its interaction in specific contexts with other economic policy 
instruments, with politics and with the financial conditions under which private investment 
decisions are made.   
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.  
Variables Abbrev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth grwgdppc 611    3.348778    3.819642   -15.28408   18.50676 
Taxes revenue taxrev 562    15.68105    5.201454   0.7797023    39.6604 
Taxes on goods and services taxgs 561    33.60719    10.81914   8.765734   60.94431 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains taxipc 560    22.26865    11.85935   1.375151   55.98266 
Taxes on international trade taxit 559    11.77163    10.49593   -14.79745   49.84525 
Initial income per capita iipc 611    1444.755    1498.524   122.5518   6872.734 
Inflation (CPI) inf 608    10.06346    30.79969   -8.237844   513.9069 
Government expenditures ggfce 594    13.86403    5.155787    2.05759    42.50581 
Investment inv 596    21.47724    5.582428   6.663808   52.50877 
Savings gds 596    16.32998    10.45894   -8.524429   56.23207 
Labor force growth lfg 611    -0.016477    0.060005   -0.077115    1.39824 
Unemployment unempl 611    8.016094    5.210144         0.7        37.6 
Dependency ratio popag 610    39.11029    6.871858   27.88127   51.97086 
Openness opne 603    79.08871    36.95621   4.560668   220.4074 
 
 
 Table 2: The sources of variables.  
Variables Description Source 
GDP per capita growth Annual average of GDP per capita growth rate (in %) WDI 
Taxes revenue Tax revenue (% of GDP) WDI 
Taxes on goods and services Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue) WDI 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue) WDI 
Taxes on international trade Taxes on international trade (% of revenue) WDI 
Initial income per capita 
GDP per capita for the initial year of each subperiod, 
current prices 
WDI 
Inflation (CPI) Annual inflation (in %) WDI 
Government expenditures 
General government final consumption expenditure as a 
share of GDP, current prices (in %) WDI 
Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, current 
prices (in %) 
WDI 
Savings 
Gross domestic savings as a share of GDP, current prices 
(in %) 
WDI 
Labor force growth Labor force growth (in %) WDI 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) WDI 
Dependency ratio 
Population aged 0-14 and >65 as a share of total 
population (in %) WDI 
Openness Export and import as a share of GDP (in %) WDI 
   Note: WDI is defining as World Data Indicator. 
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      Table 3: Unit root test on panel data (Fisher-type Test). 
Series 
(Abbrev.) 
ADF PP 
Constant Trend Trend 
Test (P) p-val Int. Or Test (P) p-val Int. Or Test (P) p-val Int. Or 
grwgdppc 430.5750 0.0000 I(0) 318.4544 0.0000 I(0) 318.4544 0.0000 I(0) 
taxrev 248.1433 0.0000 I(0) 310.9102 0.0000 I(3) 118.1614 0.0467 I(2) 
taxgs 296.5341 0.0000 I(0) 150.0530 0.0002 I(0) 150.0530 0.0002 I(0) 
taxipc 255.2307 0.0000 I(0) 135.9717 0.0030 I(0) 135.9717 0.0030 I(0) 
taxit 305.4725 0.0000 I(0) 147.1538 0.0004 I(0) 147.1538 0.0004 I(0) 
inf 515.8436 0.0000 I(0) 387.8828 0.0000 I(0) 387.8828 0.0000 I(0) 
ggfce 279.7148 0.0000 I(0) 171.4154 0.0000 I(0) 171.4154 0.0000 I(0) 
inv 232.0402 0.0000 I(0) 147.9684 0.0003 I(0) 147.9684 0.0003 I(0) 
gds 287.8671 0.0000 I(0) 125.3683 0.0170 I(2) 130.2819 0.0079 I(2) 
lfg 374.2755 0.0000 I(0) 288.3800 0.0000 I(0) 288.3800 0.0000 I(0) 
unempl 277.9455 0.0000 I(0) 184.6877 0.0000 I(0) 184.6877 0.0000 I(0) 
popag 409.2397 0.0000 I(0) 299.2751 0.0000 I(0) 299.2751 0.0000 I(0) 
opne 278.2253 0.0000 I(0) 141.1393 0.0012 I(0) 141.1393 0.0012 I(0) 
      Source : Author, based on the World Data Indicator (WDI). 
 
  Table 4: Estimations robustness tests.  
 Obs. Test on AR(1) Test on AR(2) Sargent Test  Hansen Test 
(1) 540 Z= -4.27 [0.000] Z= -0.94 [0.345] chi2(66)= 207.17 [0.000] chi2(66)= 33.04 [1.000] 
(2) 543 Z= -4.54 [0.000] Z= -0.89 [0.374] chi2(97)= 246.33 [0.000] chi2(97)= 30.38 [1.000] 
(3) 542 Z= -4.67 [0.000] Z= -1.03 [0.303] chi2(97)= 259.45 [0.000] chi2(97)= 31.47 [1.000] 
(4) 540 Z= -4.62 [0.000] Z= -1.10 [0.271] chi2(99)= 256.39 [0.000] chi2(99)= 26.29 [1.000] 
(5) 540 Z= -4.43 [0.000] Z= -1.30 [0.195] chi2(99)= 256.66 [0.000] chi2(99)= 29.75 [0.997] 
(6) 540 Z= -4.59 [0.000]  Z= -1.16 [0.248] chi2(97)= 257.35 [0.000] chi2(97)= 27.34 [1.000] 
(7) 540 Z= -4.28 [0.000]  Z= -0.57 [0.567] chi2(88)= 237.01 [0.000] chi2(88)= 30.40 [1.000] 
(8) 540 Z= -4.58 [0.000]  Z= -1.16 [0.246] chi2(99)= 257.36 [0.000] chi2(99)= 26.44 [1.000] 
    Source : Author, based on the estimations. 
Table 5: Calculation of coefficients values ( −α 1 ) of the lagged endogenous variable in   
                the growth model  
Estimations Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
(1) -0.8301907 0.0673983 -12.32 0.000 
(2) -0.8261688 0.0631239 -13.09 0.000 
(3) -0.8211981 0.0617139 -13.31 0.000 
(4) -0.8407496 0.0610315 -13.78 0.000 
(5) -0.8390969 0.0667758 -12.57 0.000 
(6) -0.8466133 0.0612841 -13.81 0.000 
(7) -0.8140474 0.0696662 -11.68 0.000 
(8) -0.8440955 0.0615381 -13.72 0.000 
Source : Author, based on the estimations. 
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Table 6: Taxes and economic growth, one-step GMM estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita growth  
lagged (-1) 
0.170 0.174 0.179 0.159 0.161 0.153 0.186 0.156 
(2.52)** (2.75)*** (2.90)*** (2.61)** (2.41)** (2.50)** (2.67)** (2.53)** 
         
Taxes revenue 0.404 1.920 1.017 1.370 1.108 1.339 0.468 1.342 
 (1.82)* (2.93)*** (1.46) (2.52)** (1.77)* (2.30)** (0.97) (2.32)** 
Taxes revenue squared  -0.040 -0.020 -0.026 -0.019 -0.025 -0.006 -0.025 
 (2.33)** (1.13) (1.88)* (1.23) (1.72)* (0.57) (1.74)* 
         
Taxes on goods and 
services 
-0.013 -0.057 -0.112 -0.022 -0.045 -0.017 -0.009 -0.021 
(0.29) (0.28) (0.67) (0.12) (0.28) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) 
Taxes on goods and 
services squared 
 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.34) (0.96) (0.14) (0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.14) 
         
Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains 
-0.184 -0.400 -0.412 -0.444 -0.463 -0.452 -0.311 -0.444 
(3.35)*** (2.26)** (2.33)** (2.62)** (2.39)** (2.60)** (1.92)* (2.61)** 
Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains squared 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 
 (1.61) (1.75)* (1.93)* (1.92)* (1.97)* (1.06) (1.90)* 
         
Taxes on international 
trade 
-0.113 -0.242 -0.143 -0.241 -0.304 -0.237 -0.082 -0.244 
(1.73)* (1.84)* (1.29) (1.98)* (2.35)** (2.00)* (0.82) (2.04)** 
Taxes on international 
trade squared 
 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.005 
 (1.75)* (1.25) (1.65) (1.83)* (1.69)* (0.36) (1.68)* 
         
Initial income per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.51)** (3.56)*** (2.57)** (3.18)*** (2.64)** (3.13)*** (2.03)** (3.19)*** 
Inflation -0.026  -0.012 -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013 
 (5.75)***  (1.71)* (2.29)** (2.38)** (2.21)** (3.88)*** (2.25)** 
Government expenditures -0.527 -0.520  -0.459 -0.529 -0.471 -0.296 -0.456 
 (2.01)* (2.38)**  (2.23)** (2.39)** (2.16)** (1.48) (2.19)** 
Investment -0.015 0.006 0.029  0.055 0.013 0.040 0.014 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.36)  (0.62) (0.15) (0.59) (0.16) 
Savings 0.167 0.164 0.181 0.163  0.158 0.113 0.161 
 (3.08)*** (3.05)*** (3.34)*** (3.24)***  (3.08)*** (2.65)** (3.12)*** 
Labor force growth 3.268 2.877 3.324 3.078 2.816  4.447 3.082 
 (1.99)* (1.96)* (2.45)** (2.10)** (1.90)*  (4.15)*** (2.14)** 
Unemployment 0.466 0.432 0.422 0.444 0.408 0.459  0.445 
 (2.18)** (2.40)** (2.69)*** (2.73)*** (2.36)** (2.74)***  (2.66)** 
Dependency ratio 0.195 0.201 0.211 0.218 0.151 0.212 0.126 0.221 
 (1.98)* (2.09)** (2.10)** (2.37)** (1.55) (2.43)** (2.16)** (2.49)** 
Openness 0.057 0.032 0.021 0.037 0.057 0.036 0.060 0.036 
 (2.13)** (1.56) (1.22) (1.97)* (2.51)** (1.71)* (2.78)*** (1.88)* 
Constant -6.731 -15.684 -14.645 -12.250 -4.821 -12.163 -3.571 -12.375 
 (0.80) (2.24)** (1.91)* (2.06)** (0.82) (2.01)* (0.80) (2.06)** 
         
F statistic  13.87 8.81 12.13 17.97 9.45 14.77 15.52 15.50 
Observation 540 543 542 540 540 540 540 540 
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Notes: Significant levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standards errors are in the brackets. 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 1:  GDP growth per capita versus taxes revenue. 
 
                     Source : Author, based on the data. 
 
 Figure 2:  GDP growth per capita versus taxes on goods and services. 
 
                       Source : Author, based on the data. 
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 Figure 3:  GDP growth per capita versus taxes on income, profits and capital gains. 
 
               Source : Author, based on the data. 
 
 Figure 4:  GDP growth per capita versus taxes on international trade. 
  
                 Source : Author, based on the data. 
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Appendix C: Country list 
Angola 
Armenia 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Congo. Dem. Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Egypt. Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
 Zambia 
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